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Abstract: The aim of this study was to prove whether manager coped its earnings for the purpose of 
informative or target opportunistic. Research also investigated whether investment opportunity set 
infl uenced the choice of manager to report as opportunistic to hide performance, or to report earn-
ing more informative concerning with debt, political cost, market share, and earning. Sample of this 
research was chosen by using purposive sampling of 350 manufacturing business listed in the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange, started from 1997 up to 2002. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) by using program 
of Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) was considered as the appropriate statistical technique to 
examine pattern relation of formed model. The results showed that earning management conducted 
by manager in Developing Market such as Indonesia represented informative earning management 
which meant all investors had more own belief in earning reporting, but this research could not 
prove that company owning high investment opportunity set tended to conduct informative earning 
management.
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et al., 2008). Managerial selection on earning 
management ensures that Investment Opportunity 
Set (IOS) affects contractual event, then infl uences 
managerial selection on accounting method to be 
used (Chen et al., 2008).
Despite the impossibility of clear ex-post 
difference between these two motivations, in long-
term perspective, rational investors compare earning 
reporting with actual performance and screen 
management’s interpretation of earning reporting. In 
one hand, if managers of a certain company specially 
concern with an interest of giving information to 
investors, then future performance of the company 
remains similar to the fl ow of earning reporting and, 
thus, investors feel more confi dent with earning 
Financial statements as source of information are 
used to assess fi nancial position and performance 
of the company. It contains balance sheet, income 
statement, and statement of equity that made 
relies on accrual bases, and statement of cash fl ow 
made on cash bases. Therefore, accrual base of 
fi nancial statements give a chance for manager 
to modify fi nancial statement in order to produce 
expected earning. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principle (GAAP) provides a manager to freely select 
accounting methods to be used in preparing fi nancial 
statement (Veronica & Bachtiar, 2003). Managerial 
selection motivates managerial acts into informative 
earning management or opportunistic earning 
management (Siregar & Utama, 2008; and Jiraporn 
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reporting. On the other hand, if managers of the 
company seem motivated to hide information from 
investors, then future performance of the company 
differs from earning reporting fl ow resulting in 
lack of investors’ trust to earning reporting. These 
also mean there are different motivations among 
managers. The company where the investors establish 
discretionary accrual positively appears having more 
opportunistic earning management. In other word, 
motivational difference in the opportunistic earning 
management causes different economic impact 
measured by investors’ response to more effi cient 
capital market. 
DeAngelo (1988) determines that managers 
use accrual opportunistically to conceal performance, 
but it results in negative market reaction. However, 
Dechow (1994) impresses that accrual based earning 
produces a privileged measure toward company 
performance rather than cash fl ow. Subramanyam 
(1996) shows that, in average, discretionary and non-
discretionary market values remain as part of accrual. 
These literatures, however, do not explain whether 
the companies with different characteristic display 
different opportunistic and informative earning 
managements. Moreover, researcher investigates 
company growth, called Investment Opportunity 
Set, in relative with the behavior of informative 
and opportunistic earning managements based on 
research fi ndings of Gul et al., (2003), Riahi-Belkoui 
(2003), Nuswantara (2004), and Chen et al., (2008) 
throughout Indonesian companies.
Researcher considers the following premises: 
fi rstly, it retests earning management theory by 
investigating it from investment opportunity set, 
debt, political cost and market concentration at 
developing market, especially Indonesian capital 
market. Research follows previous studies, such as 
Cahan, 1992; Rajgopal, 1999; Gu, 2002; Gu, et al. 
2003; Riahi-Belkoui, 2003, and Chen et al., 2008 
conducted at developing countries. Meanwhile, 
Nuswantara (2004) examines Indonesian market 
(developing market), but it confi nes only to the 
effect of market concentration and debt on earning 
management, and the results consistence with 
other researchers although it was conducted in 
different research objects within Indonesia. This 
research, however, has been classifi ed into extended 
replication, particularly replicating research by Gul et 
al., (2003) and Chen et al., 2008 with some additional 
new variables obtained from Nuswantara’s research 
fi ndings (2004), and political cost hypothesis from 
Cahan (1992). Secondly, researcher would like to 
understand the effect of investment opportunity 
set on earning management by relating investment 
opportunity set with political cost, and using market 
concentration as main determinant of investment 
opportunity set and earning management. Thirdly, 
measuring investment opportunity set in this 
research extends the research scope wider than Gul 
et al., (2003), Riahi-Belkoui (2003) and Chen et al., 
2008. Lastly, this research examines the effect of 
each of independent variables against dependent 
variables simultaneously by conducting Analysis 
Moment Structure (AMOS) 4.0.
Investigated problems in this research include: 
(a) are investment opportunity set based on share, 
investment, and variant contribute to investment 
opportunity set?, (b) do earning management, 
investment opportunity set, debt, political cost, 
market concentration, and earning affect share 
price?, (c) do they (investment opportunity set, debt, 
political cost, and market concentration) infl uence 
earning management?, (d) do investment opportunity 
set, debt, political cost, and market concentration 
give impact on earning?, (e) how does the effect of 
investment opportunity set on debt?, (f) how does 
the effect of debt on market concentration?
This research is expected to give the following 
benefi ts: (1) Theoretical benefi t. Research gives 
empirical evidence related to contracting theory 
of Watts & Zimmerman (1986) confi rming that 
IOS affects contractual events and then infl uences 
manager’s selection on accounting method to be 
used. Other empirical evidences related to the 
relationship between earning management and 
investment opportunity set from Gul et al. (2003) 
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and Riahi-Belkoui (2003) asserting that higher IOS 
companies managing earning more as a tool to 
transfer valuable relevant private information rather 
than to hide opportunistically bad performance. 
(2) Practical benefi t. The practical benefi t in 
this research involves the following: (a) to investors 
and capital market analysts, it provides a guide for 
decision making to capital market actors (investors, 
brokers, and security analysts), and investor 
candidates in the future, especially when they come 
to make investment decision; (b) to Indonesian 
Institute of Accountants (IAI), research provides a 
way for IAI to become standard setter through the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (DSAK) in 
narrowing the space for management to avoid from 
unexpected opportunistic earning management 
against company and interested parties in the 
company (stakeholders).
CONTRIBUTION OF IOS, INVESTMENT,     
AND VARIANT TO IOS
Baker (1993) stipulates that proxies need 
to be developed and improved because every 
proxy, especially individually used proxy, carries 
measurement error (Smith & Watts, 1992; Gaver & 
Gaver, 1993). Bartholomew (1987) opinion quoted 
by Mahfud (2004) insists that any considerations fi nd 
necessary to simplify the data through integration 
of observed variables into composite variables. 
Observed variables integration into composite 
variables facilitates the understanding of observed 
phenomenon and these seem used as description or 
used in further analysis as regression variables. 
THE EFFECT OF EARNING  MANAGEMENT, 
IOS, DEBT, POLITICAL COST, AND           
MARKET CONCENTRATION, EARNING       
ON SHARE PRICE
The effect of earning management on share 
price has been proved in research by Hartono 
(1998 and 2000); Gul et al., (2003); Ardiati (2003). 
Earning management smoothes managerial action 
to communicate private information and, therefore, 
improves earning capability to refl ect company’s 
economic value. The effect of investment opportunity 
set (IOS) on share price has been connected to Smith 
& Watts (1992), Riahi-Belkoui (2001) and Gul et al., 
(2003) studies. Their fi ndings underline positive 
relationship between IOS and share price. Smith & 
Watts (1992) concluded that managers in company 
with relatively higher ISO produce a wise decision-
making because they have better information 
on investment opportunity set than company’s 
shareholder. 
Through debt hypothesis, company with higher 
debt forces manager to select an accounting policy 
shifting future earning toward current earning 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Gul et al., moreover, 
(2003) clarify that debt negatively affects share price 
because higher debt rate gives more incentives to 
opportunistic earning management in meeting debt 
covenant requirement. This argument estimates that 
higher company debt means lower share price. 
Size hypothesis explains that in larger 
companies, manager considers an accounting policy 
retaining current earning to have future earning 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Company’s size positively 
affects earning quality, and it seems higher earning 
quality in larger companies than in smaller one (Gul 
et al., 2003). Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) cited by 
Komalasari (2000) declared that larger company 
with greater risk to investors receives the greatest 
earning per share (increased share value). 
Nuswantara (2004) conducted a research 
testing the effect of market concentration on share 
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price. Market concentration positively relates to share 
price because the company within higher industrial 
concentration tends to select accounting policy that 
declines in the future (Nuswantara, 2004). If market 
share of larger company facilitates a strong position 
in competition, company signals a better condition 
in the future to make investors positively reacting 
toward the company. 
Studies on the relationship between earning 
and share price have been related to Ali (1994), 
Asyik (1999), Harries (1999), Gunawan (1999), and 
Candrarin & Tearney (2000). The results indicate a 
signifi cant positive relationship between earning 
and share price. 
THE EFFECT OF IOS, DEBT, POLITICAL 
COST, AND MARKET CONCENTRATION ON 
 EARNING MANAGEMENT
Skinner (1993), Gul et al., (2003), Riahi-Belkoui 
(2003), Nuswantara (2004), and Chen, et al., (2008) 
have studied the effect of investment opportunity 
set (IOS) on earning management. Some evidences 
from previous literature, likes Skinner (1993), proved 
that company with higher investment opportunity 
exhibits greater earning management. According to 
Gul et al., (2003) manager of company with higher 
growth inclines to the use of earning management to 
mark their information about company investment 
opportunity in the future. 
Results of Nuswantara (2004), Riahi-Belkoui 
(2003), and Perez & Hemmen (2009) researches 
pointed out the negative effect between debt 
and earning management. This occurs due to too 
loose creditor monitoring. Slackened monitoring 
motivates earning management, or in other words, 
monitoring mechanism does not prevent the 
company from conducting earning management. 
However, researches from Chau & Lee (1999), and 
Gul et al. (2003), fi nd that company debt positively 
relates to earning management. Debt rate of 
company results in improving earning management 
aimed at maintaining good performance in auditor 
view. Therefore, signifi cant affect occurs between 
debt and earning management.
Larger company has more complete disclosure 
that seems accessible to auditor examination than 
smaller one. This causes more conservative reporting 
of accounting and earning manipulation (Cahan, 
1992; Gul et al. 2003; Nuswantara, 2004). Research’s 
results of Rajgopal (1999), Gu (2002), Gul, et al. (2003), 
and Nuswantara (2004) confi rmed that asset relates 
negatively to earning management. This argument 
expects negative relationship between political cost 
and earning management rate.
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) quoted in Nuswantara 
(2004) explain that product market competition 
reduces company profi tability. If the company seems 
ineffi cient, it reduces company earning. Therefore, 
a manager of a company with lower profi tability 
manipulates company’s earning such that investors 
still involve their capital within company. If market 
share of company remains small, company has a 
weak position in competition and, thus, manipulates 
company’s earning to a better appearance. This 
argument expects a negative relationship between 
market concentration and earning management 
rate. 
The company with greater market strength has 
a chance to conduct earning management. Greater 
market strength means greater earning management 
practice, especially if external monitoring condition 
seems rarely (lower debt). 
THE EFFECT OF IOS, DEBT, POLITICAL 
COST, AND MARKET CONCENTRATION ON 
 EARNING RATE RELEVANCY
Manager uses earning management through 
IOS to communicate private information credibly to 
the investors. This makes earning statement more 
informative on the future of company, and improves 
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relevancy of earning rate. Therefore, positive impact 
occurs from investment opportunity set on earning.
Previous research fi ndings, by Watts & 
Zimmerman (1978) and Zimmerman (1983) and 
Warfi eld et al., (1995), clarifi ed that debt negatively 
affect earning because higher rate of debt gives more 
incentives to opportunistic earning management in 
meeting debt covenant requirement.
Larger company has more information than 
the smaller one. Therefore, new innovation has a 
great impact on earning of smaller company rather 
than larger company. Chaney & Jeter (1991) showed 
in their fi nding that company size signifi cantly and 
positively correlates with earning. 
Greater marker share means greater earning 
the company obtains. This argument forecasts the 
positive effect of market concentration on earning 
management rate.
THE EFFECT OF IOS ON DEBT
According to Myers’s (1977) argument, 
company with higher book value ratio appears 
more optimized if its debt ratio also increases. Myers 
(1977) emphasized an optimum profi t that investors 
possibly obtain if they face higher bankruptcy 
risk. Company with higher book value ratio wants 
higher profi t in the future such that the company 
enjoys optimum profi t through tax profi t. Result of 
Chen (2005) research proves that company growth 
positively relates to company debt. 
HYPOTHESIS 
H
1
 :  Investment Opportunity Set based on share, 
investment, and variant, contributes to 
Investment Opportunity Set.
H
2
 :  Earning management affects share price.
H
3
 : Investment opportunity set positively affects 
share price.
H
4
 : Higher company debt adversely affects share 
price.
H
5
 : Political cost positively affects share price.
H
6
 : Market strength refl ected from market 
concentration positively affects share price.
H
7
 : Higher company earning positively affects 
share price. 
H
8
 : Investment opportunity set positively affects 
earning management.
H
9
 : Higher debt of company affects earning 
management.
H
10
 : Political cost relates negatively to earning 
management.
H
11
 : Negative impact of market concentration 
emerges as refl ected from market 
concentration against earning management 
practice.
H
12
 : Positive impact of debt on market 
strength emerges as refl ected from market 
concentration.
H
13
 :  Higher investment opportunity set positively 
affects earning.
H
14
 : Higher debt rate negatively affects earning. 
H15 = Political cost positively affects earning.
H
15
 : Political cost positively affects earning.
H
16
 : Market concentration positively affects 
earning.
H
17
 : Positive impact develops from company with 
higher investment opportunity set on debt 
rate.
METHOD
Related to the problem characteristic examined, 
research may be classifi ed as a comparative causal 
research (Indriantoro & Supomo, 1999). Operational 
defi nition and variable measurement have been 
shown at Table 1.
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Table 1. Variable Measurement
No Indicator IOS Measurement
1 Market to book value of equity (MBVE) MBVE = [Circulated Share x Share Closing Price]: Equity Total
2 Book to market value of assets (MBVA) MBVA = [Assets Total – Equity Total + Circulated Share x Share Clos-
ing Price] divided by Assets Total
3 Tobin’s Q (TOBIQ) Tobin’s Q = {[Circulated Share x Share Closing Price] + Debt Total + 
Supply – Current Asset} divided by Assets Total. 
4 Earnings to price ratios (PER) PER = [Share Closing Price per Sheet]: Net Earning per Sheet 
5 Ratio of property, plant, and equipment 
to firm value of the assets (PPEFVA)
EPS = [Assets Total-Equity Total + Circulated Share*Share Closing 
Price] divided by net fi xed asset.
6 Ratio of depreciation to fi rm value (DFV) DFV = Assets Total – Equity Total + [Circulated Share x Share Closing 
Price] divided by Depreciation Cost.
7 Ratio of capital expenditure to book 
value of assets (CEBVA)
CEBVA = [Fixed Asset Book Value t – Fixed Asset Book Value t
-1
]: [As-
sets Total]
8 Ratio of capital expenditure to market of 
assets (CEMVA)
CEMVA = (Fixed Asset Book Value t – Fixed Asset Book Value t
-1
): [As-
sets Total – Equity Total + (Circulated Share*Share Closing Price)]
9 Ratio of Investment to Net Sales (INS) INS = Investment / Net Sales
10 Systematic Risk (RS) Fowler & Rorke (1983) Beta Correction
11 Company size (SIZE) Total Value Logarithm of company
12 Market Concentration (KSP) KSP = (Company Sale / Industrial Sale) x 100 %
13 Debt (DEBT) Debt = (Debt Total of company i at period t): (Assets Total of company 
i at period t)
14 Earning Annual net earning before extraordinary items
15 Discretionary Accruals (DA) Jones (1991) modifi ed model
16 Abnormal Return Market adjusted model
AR
i,t
 = R
i,t
 – E (R
i,t
)
CAR = C R = 
!
!
nt
t
itAR
1
Exogenous variables in this path coeffi cient 
include IOS and KP, while endogenous variables 
involve DEBT, KSP, DA, EARN and AR, and the 
structural equation remains as the following: 
DEBT = β13 IOS + β13
KSP  = β14 DEBT + β14
DA  = β15 IOS + β16 DEBT + β17 KP + β18 KSP
  + β15
EARN = β19 IOS + β20 DEBT + β21 KP + β22 KSP
  + β16
AR  = β23DA + β24IOS + β25KP + β26 DEBT
  + β27KSP + β28 EARN + β17
Where:
DEBT = Debt 
IOS  = Investment Opportunity Set 
KSP  = Market Concentration 
KP  = Political Cost 
DA  = Discretionary Accruals
EARN = Earning 
AR  = Return Abnormal Accumulation
β
13
-β
28
 = Loading Factor (Standardized Regression 
Coeffi cient)
β
13
-β
17
 = Error Term 
Uni-dimensional of the model should be tested 
through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), and its 
path diagram may be shown at Figure 1.
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Picture 1. Structural Equation Analysis at Measurement Model of Conceptual Model Line Diagram on Effect 
Investment Opportunity Set (IOS), Debt (DEBT), Political Cost (KP), and Market Concentration (KSP) toward 
Earnings Management (DA), Earning (EARN) and Stock Price (AR)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The detail result of confi rmatory factorial 
analysis is shown in Table 2. The result of factorial 
analysis for the three Investment Opportunity Set 
proxies shows that all indicators give contribution to 
Investment Opportunity Set variable with probability 
lower than 0.05 (5%) and fi x model.
Tabel 2. Measurement of Investment 
 Opportunity Set Variable 
Construct
Load-
ing 
Factor
CR
Tabel t 
(α=5%)
Sign 
Descrip-
tion
IOSp ←  IOS -0.150 -3.461 1.98 0.000 Signifi cant
IOSi ←  IOS 0.035 Fix 1.98 Signifi cant
Construct
Load-
ing 
Factor
CR
Tabel t 
(α=5%)
Sign 
Descrip-
tion
IOSv ←  IOS 0.518 Fix 1.98 Signifi cant
Source: Processed secondary data 
Exogenous variables of this path coeffi cient 
entail investment opportunity set (IOS) and Political 
Cost (KP), while endogenous variables comprise to 
debt (DEBT), market concentration (KSP), earning 
management (DA), earning (EARN), and abnormal 
return (AR). Relying on Table 3, the structural 
equation takes a following form:
DEBT = 0.330 IOS + ε
13
KSP = 0.056 DEBT + ε
14
DA = -0.095 IOS + 0.148 DEBT – 0.123 KP
  + 0.080 KSP + ε
15
IOS
IOSp IOSi
MVABVA
e2
1
TOBIQ
e3
1
PER
e4
1
DFV
e5
1
VPPE
e6
1
1
CEBVA
e7
1
CEMVA
e8
1
INS
e9
1
IOSv
e10
1MVEBVA
e1
1
e11
e121 1
DEBT
KP
KSP
EARN
e13
e14
e16
1
1
H13
H14
H16
H15
1
DA
AR e17
e15
1
H9
H8
H10
H
1
1
H3
H4
H5
H6
H
2
H
7
H
17
H12
1
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EARN  = -0.033 IOS – 0.409 DEBT – 0.066 KP
  + 0.209 KSP + ε
16
AR = 0.086 DA + 0.539 IOS – 0.543 KP
  – 0.024 DEBT + 0.299 KSP + 0.177 EARN ε
17
Tabel 3. Test of Causality Effect IOS, Debt, Political Cost, and Market Concentration toward Earnings 
Management, Earning and Stock Price
H Construct Loading Factor
Effect
CR Sign Description 
Direct Indirect Total
H2 AR <-- DA 0.086 0.086 0.000 0.086 1.648*** 0.099 Signifi cant
H3 AR <-- IOS 0.539 0.539 -0.035 0.504 Fix Signifi cant
H4 AR <-- DEBT -0.024 -0.024 -0.041 -0.064 -0.313 0.754 Not Signifi cant
H5 AR <-- KP -0.543 -0.543 -0.022 -0.565 -4.954* 0.000 Signifi cant
H6 AR <-- KSP 0.299 0.299 0.044 0.343 2.929* 0.003 Signifi cant
H7 AR <-- EARN 0.177 0.177 0.000 0.177 3.078* 0.002 Signifi cant
H8 DA <-- IOS -0.095 -0.095 0.050 -0.045 -1.007 0.314 Not Signifi cant
H9 DA <--  DEBT 0.148 0.148 0.004 0.152 2.616* 0.009 Signifi cant
H10 DA <--  KP -0.123 -0.123 0.000 -0.123 -1.076 0.282 Not Signifi cant
H11 DA <-- KSP 0.080 0.080 0.000 0.080 0.870 0.384 Not Signifi cant
H12 KSP <--  DEBT 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.056 1.110 0.267 Not Signifi cant
H13 EARN <--  IOS -0.033 -0.033 -0.131 -0.164 -0.351 0.726 Not Signifi cant
H14 EARN <--  DEBT -0.409 -0.409 0.012 -0.397 -7.984* 0.000 Signifi cant
H15 EARN <--  KP -0.066 -0.066 0.000 -0.066 -0.592 0.554 Not Signifi cant
H16 EARN <--  KSP 0.209 0.209 0.000 0.209 2.318** 0.020 Signifi cant
H17 DEBT <-- IOS 0.330 0.330 0.000 0.330 3.288* 0.001 Signifi cant
* Signifi cant at level 10%, value table t at level 1% = 2.57 
**  Signifi cant at level 10%, value table t at level 5% = 1.98
*** Signifi cant at level 10%, value table t at level 10% = 1.64
The results show that earning management, 
political cost, market share, and earning have a 
signifi cant effect to share price, whereas investment 
opportunity set does not have a signifi cant effect to 
share price. Among variables which infl uence earning 
management, the debt haves a signifi cant effect 
while other variable (i.e., investment opportunity 
set, political cost, and market share) do not show 
signifi cant outcomes. Variable that signifi cantly 
infl uencing earning are only debt and market share, 
while other variable, investment opportunity set and 
political cost, do not show signifi cant infl uence.
DISCUSSION
IOS proxy measures company growth’s 
potential. Myers (1977) proposed that investment 
decision on asset combination to be owned in 
the future infl uences company value. Further 
development of this theory emanates from Smith & 
Watts (1992), Skinner (1993), Gaver & Gaver (1993), 
Cahan & Hossain (1995), (1999), Kallapur & Trombley 
(1999), Gul, (1999), Subekti & Kusuma (1999 and 
2001), Fijrianti (2000), Prasetyo (2000), Adam, et al. 
(2000 & 2003), Al Najjar & Belkaoui (2001), Abbott 
(2001), Jones, et al. (2001), Subekti & Kusuma (2001), 
and Mira et al. (2002). All of them examine company 
growth potential. 
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Previous researches, however, never attest 
statistically that each indicator contributes to 
Price-based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSp) and 
Investment-based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSi). 
The contribution is also developed Price-based 
Investment Opportunity Set (IOSp), Investment-based 
Investment Opportunity Set (IOSi), and Variant-
based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSv). Research 
also concerns with confi rmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
proving that Book to Market Value of Assets (MBVA), 
Tobin’s Q (TOBIQ), Price Earning ratios (PER), Ratio of 
Depreciation to Firm Value (DFV), and Firm Value to 
Book Value of PPE (VPPE), contributed to Price-based 
Investment Opportunity Set (IOSp). Ratio of Capital 
Expenditure to Book Value of Assets (CEBVA), Ratio 
of Capital Expenditure to Market of Assets (CEMVA), 
and Investment to Net Sales Ratio (INS) contributed 
to Investment-based Investment Opportunity 
Set (IOSp). Results of research also showed that 
Price-based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSp), 
Investment-based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSi), 
and Variant-based Investment Opportunity Set (IOSv) 
contributed to Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) 
through beyond critical value for all dimensions. 
Previous fi ndings showed that earning 
management negatively infl uenced share price 
(Hartono, 1998 and 2000; Gul et al., 2003; and Ardiati, 
2003); investment opportunity set (IOS) positively 
affect share price (Smith & Watts, 1992; Riahi-Belkoui, 
2001; and Gul, et al., 2003); debt negatively affects 
share price (Gul, et al., 2003); political cost positively 
affects share price (Marwata, 1999; Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991, cited by Komalasari, 2000, and 
Gul, et al., 2003); market strength refl ected from 
market concentration positively affects share price. 
Positive impact of investment opportunity set (IOS) 
variable on earning management has been found 
from Skinner (1993), Subramanian (1996), Riahi-
Belkoui (2003), Gul (2003), Nuswantara (2004), and 
Chen, et al., (2008). Other fi ndings indicate that 
debt positively affects earning management (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1986,1990; Nuswantara, 2004); 
political cost negatively affects earning management 
(Rajgopal, 1999; Gu, 2002; Riahi Belkeoui, 2003, Gul, 
et al., 2003; Nuswantara, 2004); and market strength 
refl ected by market concentration negatively affects 
earning management (Nuswantara, 2004). Smith & 
Watts (1992) and Gul, et.al (2003) found positive 
effect of investment opportunity set (IOS) variable on 
earning, while other researches ascertain that debt 
negatively affects earning (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Gul, 
et al., 2003), political cost positively affects earning 
(Chaney & Jeter, 1992; and Warfi eld, et al., 1995), 
market strength refl ected by market concentration 
positively affects earning (Nuswantara, 2004).
In addition to retesting previous research 
variables, results of this research confi rm that 
earning management (DA), political cost (KP), 
market concentration (KSP), and earning (EARN) 
have signifi cant effect on share price (AR), 
meanwhile investment opportunity set (IOS) does 
not have signifi cant effect on share price (AR). 
Among variables affecting earning management 
(DA), only debt (DEBT) has a signifi cant effect, while 
other variables (Investment Opportunity Set (IOS), 
Political Cost (KP), Market concentration (KSP) seem 
have no signifi cant outcome. Among variables, only 
debt (DEBT) and market concentration (KSP) appear 
signifi cantly affect earning (EARN), while others 
including Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) and 
Political Cost (KP) does not have signifi cant effect.
Results of research clarify that SEM analysis 
with 350 observations (5 years in 70 companies) 
at manufacture companies listing at Jakarta Stock 
Exchange confers the following result. First, the 
negative impact occurs from investment opportunity 
set (IOS) against earning management. It means that 
managerial behavior to have earning management 
does not follow with fast company growth.
Second, earning management positively affects 
share price (AR). This evidence describes investor’s 
positive reaction to earning management. It also 
indicates that earning management conducted 
by Indonesian managers represents informative 
earning management. It may be investors seeming 
more confi dent to earning reporting though 
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research cannot give evidence that the company 
with investment opportunity set (IOS) may choose 
informative earning management. The result does 
not comply with estimation that company with 
higher investment opportunity set (IOS) manages its 
earning as a tool of private information with value 
relevant rather than hides opportunistically bad 
performance. 
Third, research fails to support earning 
management theory. Healy (1985) and DeAngelo 
(1988) determine that managers consider 
opportunistically accrual to conceal any performances 
causing negative reaction of the market. Despite 
managerial opportunistically use of accrual, market 
still reacts it positively because market considers this 
managerial behavior as informative management.
Fourth, research does not agree with Gul, 
et al., (2003), Riahi-Belkoui (2003) and Jiraporn 
et al., (2008) fi ndings that higher IOS companies 
tend to use earning as a tool of expressing value 
relevant private information rather than concealing 
opportunistic bad performance. Results of this 
research prove that when investment opportunity 
set grows higher, informative earning management 
becomes relatively more evident than opportunistic 
earning management.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion 
Research concludes that (a) investment 
opportunity set based on share, investment, and 
variant, contributes to investment opportunity set. 
This result agrees with Bartholomew (1987) quoted 
in Mahfud (2004) that data simplifi cation comes 
into consideration by combining observed variables 
into composite variables; (b) earning management, 
political cost, market concentration, and earning, 
provide signifi cant effect on share price, while 
investment opportunity set does not signifi cantly 
affect share price; (c) debt does not signifi cantly 
affect earning management, while other variables 
(investment opportunity set, political cost, market 
concentration) seem without signifi cant result; (d) 
debt and market concentration signifi cantly affect 
earning, while other variables involving investment 
opportunity set and political cost do not have 
signifi cant infl uence; (e) debt do not have signifi cant 
effect on market concentration, and (f) investment 
opportunity set has signifi cantly positive effect on 
debt.
Suggestion 
Further consideration leads this research to 
suggests that (a) combination model of investment 
opportunity set still has a chance to add other 
investment opportunity set proxies, such as ratio of 
R&D expense to total assets (Smith & Watts, 1992; 
Gaver & Gaver, 1993; Kallapur & Trombley, 1999; and 
Hartono, 1998), ratio of R&D expense to sales (Skinner, 
1993; and Kallapur & Trombley, 1999), ratio of capital 
additions to fi rm value (Smith & Watts, 1992; Kallapur 
& Trombley, 1999; and Jones & Sharma, 2001), Ratio 
of capital addition to assets book value (Subekti & 
Kusuma, 2001; Skinner, 1993; Kallapur & Trombley, 
1999), Investment to earning ratio (Hartono, 1998), 
and Ratio of R&D expense to fi rm value (Skinner, 
1993; Kallapur & Trombley, 1999), and (b) model 
used in this research may be developed through 
using interaction of investment opportunity set, 
debt, political cost, and market concentration, and 
earning management after considering moderating 
effect of earning management on share price.
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